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FRONTISPIECE
MSi je lathe la bride a la presse9 je ne resterai 
pas trois mois au pouvoir.”
Napoleon 
18 Brumaire
iii
PREFACE
The following work was undertaken as I am sure all such research is 
with the'hopeful thought in mind that some great unknown fact or event 
would be uncovered in the source of the researcher*s work which would 
shed new light and provide a new interpretation to already conceived 
ideas. Unfortunately, such a lofty ideal did not come to pass; 
however, unexpected side effects did transpire which made the effort 
rewarding.
The Napoleonic Empire emerges, again, as a monolithic giant 
difficult for some to understand. One man, one nation: the man - 
Napoleon - the nation - France; they are within the framework of the 
First Empire indivisible,, The magnitude of the governing of France 
and the Empire by one man, regardless of the many individuals who took 
orders from him is awe-inspiring. This aspect of the First Empire 
has been in my opinion strongly reinforced as the research has become 
more exhaustive. The parallels that can always be drawn in history 
are more sharply defined than ever if one relates the censorship that 
occurred during the First Empire and recent events, as of this 
writing, which have occurred in the United States. The similarities 
are there and with a modicum of effort something can be learned from 
them. Power is a subject of fascination for a great many people. The 
manner in which it can be achieved and put to use in just one facet 
of the daily life of a people is well worth the study.
The historical endeavor which follows is entirely the result of my 
effort and research and as such I claim all responsibility for. content 
and interpretation. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge the people 
who have been of help to me in compiling this work. Dr. Ert J. Gum, my 
advisor, must be credited with the completion of this portion of my 
studies. He is the professor who brought history to life for me in his 
classroom presentations and in his ability to make history viable in 
today’s world. If it were not for Dr-. Gum I can say unequivocally I 
would not have done any advanced work in history. Mrs. Marian Purrier 
Nelson whose work is cited in the following pages has been invaluable to 
me. Without her help as a friend and her knowledge of the period I could 
not have managed a completed page,. Last my thanks to the Department of 
History of the University of Nebraska at Omaha for its faith in me as 
evinced by its granting to me a position as a teaching assistant while 
I was engaged in my graduate course work. A special thanks to Dr. A. 
Stanley Trickett who, as chairman of the Department of History during 
my tenure as an assistant was ever ready to give of his time and experi­
ence to aid a neophyte in the halls of academia.
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND
1
Censorship in France was nothing new when Napoleon Bonaparte came
to power in November 1799. In the first half of the eighteenth century
censorship covered authors, publishers, and institutions, such as the
2
Church and Parlement. Some form of censorship of the press had existed
3
at least from the early seventeenth century. There were varying degrees
of control exercised in different areas but for France censorship was a
way of life. Both Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin dictated how news
should appear and were careful to make every effort to produce the
4
effect upon the public mind they desired.
Censorship was officially sanctioned in France by the Government as 
far back as 1515.^ The police were involved in the regulation of censor- 
ship from at least this date also. Under Louis XIII four royal censors
1
The definition of censorship, as used in this paper, is the 
deletion or suppression of publications or public performance which the 
government deemed objectionable to the public weal.
2
Albert Bachman, Censorship in France from 1715 to 1750: Voltaire * s 
Opposition (New York: Publication of the Institute of French Studies, 
Inc., Columbia University, 1934), 1. Hereafter cited as Bachman, Censor­
ship. Also see Ernest Lavisse, Histoire De France contemporaine depuis 
les origines jusqu'a la revolution. (9 vols; Paris: Librairie Hachette, 
1926), VIII, 8.
3
James Breck Perkins, France Under Mazarin (2 vols; 3rd ed.;« ;
New York: G.P. Putnams*s Sons, 1887), II, 437. Hereafter cited as 
Perkins, France.
4 5
Ibid., 438. Bachman, Censorship, 25-6.
^Ibid., 34.
1
2were appointed probably more to break the hold of the Church on manners' 
and morals than for any other reason.^ These appointments seem to have 
been one of the first actions by any French monarch to control thought 
and literature. Prior to the appointment of the four royal censors the 
Faculty of Theology had handled censorship. The four censors, called 
Doctors of the Sorbonne, were to receive payments for their service and 
in case of death they would replace their number by an election conducted 
by the Doctors of the Sorbonne and two Doctors of Theology from the 
College of Navarre. The Chancellor was instructed to give the creden­
tials of election to the candidate and since the salaries of the censors
were paid by the Crown, the censors were thereby identified with the
8 ,
government and not the university. Chancellor Pierre Seguier, in 1653,
further strengthened the hold of the government on censorship. He
rescinded the rights of the Faculty of the College of Navarre over
censorship, made three or four of them theological book censors only,
9and held them responsible to him directly. This basis for the practice
10
of censorship remained until the Revolution.
By the late seventeenth century the essential organization of 
censorship was set. The Chancellor, or the Keeper of the Seals, was the 
responsible minister. There were two departments under him, the Bureau
^Ibid., 36. Also see David T. Pottinger, The French Book Trade in 
the Ancien Regime 1500-1791, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1958), 63. Hereafter cited as Pottinger, Book Trade.
8 9
Pottinger, Book Trade, 63* Ibid.
10Ibid., 64
3Contentieux de la librarie which handled litigation between printers and
publishers, and the bureau gracieux de la librarie which handled censor-
11
ship administered by a group of readers. As the volume of work grew
the Chancellor delegated his authority to the Director of the Book Trade,
who worked through the above two departments. Undersecretaries,
however, handled the business details of the Director’s office and their
number varied considerably. There were eight in 1688, sixteen in 1704,
but by 1755, when the effectiveness of censorship was dwindling, there
12
was only one undersecretary. In addition to the undersecretaries the
Director had several assistants and worked closely with the police who
also had a large number of inspectors of their own. However, the
university did not give up its old rights of censorship so easily.
Parlement and the University both asserted they had rights over censor-
13ship even until 1789.
Rigorous censorship existed under Louis XIV, but between 1715 and
1750 Its severity began to breakdown as some so-called revolutionary
14ideas gained credence. The breakdown did not mean government policy 
had changed. Rather, it meant that people had found a way to circumvent 
the laws and the government was too cumbersome and indeed, corrupt, to 
endorse them. By 1750 censorship had lost its teeth. An underground 
had been perfected by men through which they could avoid the censorship
n ibid., 65. 12Ibid., 146-47. 13Ibid., 65.
14
Bachman, Censorship, x-xi.
4laws. As in so many areas laws concerning publications conflicted,
for as new legislation appeared the government failed to repeal the old.
The structure of the administrative authority was as confused as the laws
themselves and amidst such confusion it was not difficult to escape
16almost any indictment. Usually the King served as the primary officer
to whom the censors were responsible. However, as Kings changed and
times altered responsibility could fluctuate as did everything else. No
general statement regarding policies of the eighteenth century would
adequately cover all the facets of censorship. The political group or
religious faction in power at the time of publication of any given work
governed how that work was treated. The influence upon the King of a
mistress or a Minister was a factor as was the financial condition of
the government and the ability of an author to pay or his protectors to
subsidize his work by exerting monetary influence on those executors of
17
the law who were approachable.
Lamoignon de Malesherbes in 1750 was Director of the Book Trade, or
the head of what was called Direction de la Librarie, with a volume of
business so great that he used a form of permission to publish called
permission tacite. This form of permission covered books that were
published but released the Director from responsibility for publishing
*
them. A censor was the official who advised that the permission be
issued and it was then registered in the chancellor*s office, the head-
18
quarters of the guild, and with the Lieutenant of Police. The 
permission tacite was a function of the Directeur de la Librarie and the
15 , . , 16 . • 17 1Q 10Ibid. Ibid., 30. Ibid., 18-19.
18
Pottinger, Book Trade, 66-67.
5code de La librarie was amended to include this tool. Of course the
issuance of the permission tacite brought money into the King’s coffers
also as a fee was charged. If the book incurred the wrath of any of the
factions in the government with which the King had to contend it was a
safe way not to have to admit that the book had received a permit to be
published and it could be withdrawn from circulation (if there were any 
19
copies left). The permission tacite did not carry the stamp of the
Great Seal, was not printed in the edition of the book and thus the
public did not see the name of the censor. In other instances, a verbal
permission clandestine or simple tolerance was issued by a lieutenant 
20of police. The permission clandestine allowed a printer to produce a 
secret edition of a book with the guarantee that the printer’s shop
would receive warning in case of a raid or that the police would ignore
. , . 21any violation.
The entire structure of censorship thus was inadequate. The censors 
had no instructions concerning what they should censor, nor did they 
have any limit set on their authority. There was no coordination 
between governmental departments, and a censor had no way of knowing if 
a book might be revealing state secrets or insulting French allies. 
Additionally, the Parlement and the Chancellory were very jealous of 
each otherfe authority and would not cooperate with one another.
19
Bachman, Censorship, 146-53.
20
Pottinger, Book Trade, 67. 
2lIbid.
6The law carried penalties that were much too severe or obscure and the
22
possibility of enforcing such a law was remote. In essence what
existed in the ancien regime was a system of laws* interlocking and
overlapping, with an authority profile to match. The impracticality of
the system was obvious. For example, two copies of every work were
submitted to the censors. One copy was signed by the author and bore
his initials on each page. This copy remained in the censor's files
while the other copy was returned to the applicant with the censor*s
23
signature and initials. Many times if the censor returned an unfavor­
able report the applicant (printer or author) would resubmit the work to 
another censor who might be favorable to the book. Also, even if a 
book was approved by the censors, it might be condemned later if 
something in it offended a particular group, such as the Jansenists or 
Jesuits. Then the group would exert influence on the Court, King, or 
University or Faculty to condemn the book and the permit of the censor 
was worthless. However, usually by the time the special interest group 
had gotten the condemnation through, the edition of the book was sold 
out. All in all the entire process did little to bolster confidence in
the legal process. For example, one censor passed on The Koran stating
24
he found ". . • nothing in it contrary to religion and morals". 
Censorship was supposed to strengthen and support the ancien regime.
22
Ibid., 68.
23
Ibid., 70. Also see Fernand Mitton, La Presse Fran^aise Des 
Qrigines a La Revolution, (Paris: Guy le Prat, 1943), 186.
24
Pottinger, Book Trade* 73.
7The conflicting and complex methods of enforcing censorship plus a 
fatal division of authority in essence helped instead to undermine it
 ^ 25(the anclen regime;.
As the eighteenth century progressed and demand for reform in all
areas grew censorship underwent some radical changes. Papers,
26journals, pamphlets and posters appeared in profusion everywhere.
They were seen on display in Paris and throughout the provinces. Most
of them dealt with the rights of the individual and the sovereignity of
the people, while some decried a system which allowed two million
27
aristocrats • to dictate to twenty million people. Such public feeling
helped to bring about the wording in the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Gitizen which upheld the right that all citizens could
28
speak, write, and print freely. The phrasing, however, left room for 
interpretation by whatever group held power as did many of the laws 
passed under the Revolutionary governments.
The municipality of Paris on the recommendation of the Committee 
of Police, on 1 September 1789, felt called upon to draw attention to
25
Bachman, Censorship, 153.
2 6For purposes of this paper the word journal and papers will be 
taken to mean daily publications such as newspapers.
27Fernand Mitton, La Presse Franpaise Sous La Revolution, Le 
Consulat, L 1Empire, (Paris: Guy Le Prat, 1945), 12-13. Hereafter cited
as Mitton, La Presse Franpaise.
28Ibid., 31.
8the fact that colporters, sellers of printing, and others of the
journalistic profession were arousing and misleading the public by
certain of their statements. The assembly of the representatives of the
Commune of Paris felt that liberty of the press was being abused by some
irresponsible people. The colporters were deluding the people and
because of such delusions the Committee forbade the colporters from
calling out within Paris any writing or brochures which could be
considered as detrimental or disturbing to public order and they
30
requested all the districts to join in stopping this abuse. The 
colporters were accused of advertising only sensational matters and 
doing so in a way to suggest something different than what the paper 
reported. They were also accused of calling out items which were not 
even in the papers to better sell their wares. Indeed, one month later,
3 October 1789, things were still so out of hand that the assembly re­
called for the offenders to be brought to justice. The newspapers 
protested such accusations, so the Council General of the Commune, with 
the aid of the Department of Police issued a notice which declared that 
while it acknowledged that purveyors of false or misleading information 
were upsetting, it upheld and supported the basic right of the 
colporters and the papers to advertise the news as they saw it. The 
notice went to the sixty districts of Paris and the occasion was used 
by the procurer general to call on all patriots to curb their enthusiasm.
Colportcr3 can be equated with the modern-day newsboy, who calls
out the headlines from the daily paper.
30Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 53.
9He also made special note that the government did not desire to inspire
a clandestine press which would be ”. , . an arsenal of mischievious 
31
malcontents," Notices such as the above appeared quite frequently
which should say something about their effectiveness.
The National Assembly had several times turned its attention to
the matter of irresponsible reporting by the press. In January 1790,
the Committee of the Constitution submitted a decree against the offense
of subverting in a propagandistic manner the right granted by law,
32
However, the practices of the colporters continued unabashed, A
reverse type of censorship had come into practice - the Royalist
journals were proscribed. For example, the Feuille de jour, in
operation from December 1790 until August 1792, was condemned as
33counter revolutionary. However, from 1789 until 1792 the press enjoyed
a good deal of freedom when compared to previous years, but it cannot be
34termed unlimited liberty of the press.
The Council General of the Commune, in 1792, issued a notice 
whereby it held certain royalist journalists and papers to be poisoning 
public opinion and gave notice it would take the presses and equipment
31Ibid., 54. Also see Eugene Louis Hatin, Histoire politique et 
litteraire de la presse en France (8 vols; Paris: Poulet Malassis Et 
De Broise Librarie-]£diteurs, 1859), III-IV. Hereafter cited as Hatin, 
Histoire politique.
32Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 55.
33Ibid., 47. For a more complete list of 1789-1792 papers both 
Royalist and Revolutionary see Ibid., 31-51.
34Hatin, Histoire politique, III-IV, 263.
10
of these offending journalists and distribute them among patriotic
men. The assembly named three commissioners to administer its order.
Therefore, by 1792 the revolutionary press dominated the writing of the
35time and the Royalist press went underground. It would seem that one 
form of censorship had been substituted for another.
Lines of authority for the actions of the revolutionary governments 
to administer censorship followed somewhat traditional channelsj a fact 
which becomes apparent when compared with the practices of the monarchy. 
Though practices conformed to former usages, the confusion of authority 
which existed earlier tended to disappear. The revolutionary govern­
ment used their powers where they could to influence the press either 
directly or by coercion and bribery. Under the second ministry of Jean- 
Marie Roland de La Platiere a bureau d !esprit was established in the 
portfolio of the Minister of Interior. A decree of 18 August 1792, of 
the Legislative Assembly consecrated this organism. The Minister of the 
Interior was to have 1,000 livres at his disposal to use as he judged 
necessary within the departments and the armies to stop anti-government 
writings and to foster good public spirit. The funds alloted the 
Minister of the Interior were to be added to the six million livres
previously given to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for his secret
3 6dispensation to influence public opinion. The bureau d !esprit thus
35
Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 69-70.
3 6The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles-Francois Dumouriez, 
outlined what format he wanted the Gazette de France to use in order 
that it would give the public the desired opinion of the executive will. 
The result of this ploy was that the Gazette became the official 
Girondin organ and fell from power with the fall of the Girondins. Ibid., 
83.
distributed a great quantity of writings to the administrative depart­
ment with orders that these pages be filtered on down to lesser author­
ities for the purpose of influencing public thought. Roland also used
some of these funds to support papers which he found favorable, e.g.,
37la Sentinelle. Other journalists quite naturally resented this. Jean-
Paul Marat, for example, made an issue of this influence peddling and
published quite a diatribe against Roland in the Journal de la
3 3Republique fran9ais.
Under the Convention the same type of practice continued as had
taken place under the earlier revolutionary governments in that they
used the papers as organs for propaganda and dictated what they should
print. The Executive Council on 22 May 1793, provided 50,000 livres
for the Minister of War so that the army,would receive those papers
39best calculated to provide the proper patriotic spirit. The committee 
of Public Safety in August 1793 announced that citizen Joseph Garat was 
in charge of editing a journal which would print the correct news. The 
journal gave a periodic resume7 of the general operations of the 
Convention and was distributed regularly to the armies and the 
municipalities. The journal was called the Feuille de Salut public 
and quite obviously its articles were edited to contain what the 
Convention wanted distributed. Any journalists who offended what the 
Convention felt was fit to print or to read were called before the 
Committee of Public Safety and then referred to the Revolutionary
37 *Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 81.
38. ._ 39_,. oCIbid. Ibid., 85.
12
Tribunal where the penalty was often death. As the terror came to a
halt in 1794 the Constitution of the Year III again upheld the liberty
of the press but the press did not immediately come out of hiding- as_it
had done previously. When it did surface, that is the royalist,
revolutionary and parlimentary press, it resumed its old vitriolic
character. However, the press was unanimous in one area, they all
41attacked the government.
The Directory, in its turn, had to find a way to limit the press 
and it demanded of the Council of the Ancients and Council of Five 
Hundred that some type of legislation be enacted. After long deliber­
ation the Council voted on 17 April 1796 the first law that can properly 
be called a law of the press. The law was indicative of the type that 
the press would operate under until 1830. All printing would carry the 
name of the author and the name and place of the printer. Any 
infraction or falsification was punishable by imprisonment. The editor 
would be held responsible for all unsigned articles. In the absence of 
the author the aforesaid would apply to the printer. Distributors and 
sellers also found themselves guilty under the law if they did not 
designate the printer. Finally, all provocations in writing or by any 
other means which advocated overthrow of the Republic or the public will, 
which had previously been laid down by the Convention, was punishable by
40
Ibid., 87, 105-06.
41Ibid., 175-76. The term "the press" is used here in the generic
sense.
13
i. 42cl 6 at n«
The royalist journals were at this time in the majority and well
43
equipped to take advantage of their number. But the Directory was
able to spread counter propaganda and exercised strict control over
what was printed in official government papers. First, the Redacteur
and then the Journal des defenseurs de la patrie ". • • at the
invitation and under the auspices of the government. . . " were
44official government vessels. These papers were sent to the armies but
any diplomatic articles were submitted to the Minister of Foreign
45
Affairs for his perusal. Essentially the Directory bribed or
subsidized the papers so that they were favorable to the government.
The Minister of Police was the agent most frequently used to distribute
46
money to the papers at the order of the Directory. They had by 1797 
grown tired of the continual royalist clamor and requested of the 
Ancients and the Five Hundred a repressive law against the press. The
Five Hundred.passed such a measure but the Ancients refused. The
Royalists seized on this occasion to renew their attacks on the
Directory. The reaction of the Directory was swift and on 4 September
42Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 177.
43Ibid., 191-92.
44 'Ibid., 193. Also see Gustave Le Poittevin La Liberte de la
presse depuis la revolution 1789-1815, (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, Ifditeur, 
1901), 470 Hereafter cited as Le Poittevin, La Liberte; Hatin,
Histoire politique III-IV, 334.
45Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 193.
46Ibid., 197-98.
14
1797,. it applied the law ( of 28 Germinal Year IV) in a different
manner0 The Directory ordered that anyone who advocated a return to a
Royalist government or the Constitution of the year 1793 be shot.
Sometime later that day a notice went out ordering the arrest of a
47
number of authors and printers. The coup d*etat of 18 Fructidor
48
was the St. Bartholomew^ Day of the journalists. The Ancients and
the Five Hundred approved the Directory*s orders and on the next day
(19 Fructidor Year V) by article 355 they placed for one year all
journals, periodicals and presses under the inspection of the police
who would be able to prohibit infractions of the law by virtue of
49
Article 355 of the Constitution of the Year III. It is interesting to 
note that all through this era the police were usually charged with 
carrying out the orders of censorship or similar problems with regard to 
the press. The most frequent ending to any law passed with regard to 
regulating the press was that "the Minister of Police shall be 
charged with the implementation of this law.11 Of course, police are 
traditionally enforcers of the law; however, in France the leeway 
alloted to the charges brought by the police was very broad. To 
legislate journalistic moralities, if you will, is nebulous at best and
47Ibid., 200. For a complete list of the authors and printers see 
Ibid., 200-02; Hatin, Histoire politique, III-IV, 357.
48
Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 202;. Hatin, Histoire politique, 
III-IV, 264.
49 ✓ Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 202; Le Poittevin, La Liberte, 67.
Also see Maurice Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionnelle De La France De
1789 Ei 1870 (2 vols; Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1932), I, 399-400.
Hereafter cited as Deslandres., Histoire Const itut ionne lie.
15
requires that your enforcer use a good deal of personal judgement. In
essence if you are going to have any form of regulatory censorship you
have put into the hands of your police a tool which can be used at
their discretion and for any number of purposes. There was no new
51bureau of regulation set up and with this lack of any change it was 
fairly simple with the advent of Bonaparte and his police chief Joseph 
Fouch^ to organize the police and retain and make workable their 
traditional role.
One of the talents of a good administrator is to make use of the 
tools of administration he finds around him, particularly if those tools 
have been ineffectively utilized before but are a familiar part of a 
government. Bonaparte was such an administrator and the press was such 
a tool.
While the Directory were having their own problems with the shaping 
of public opinion, Bonaparte had begun to influence his armies * 
opinions through judicious use of the printed word. During the Italian 
campaign he founded in Milan the Gourrier de 1fArmee d TItalie. Through 
the paper Bonaparte managed to get his views across to the troops and 
counter any adverse words they might get from France. Even though 
the Courrier printed primarily military news it did contain political 
propaganda. France vue de 1fArmee d 1Italie printed views on politics,
~^Hatin, Histoire politique, I-II, 462-65, offers some interesting 
examples of police use of the censorship laws and the peoples use of 
the police.
51 ^Pierre Gaxotte, Le Siecle de Louis XV (Paris: Artheme Fayard et
C10., 1933), 304-95.
16
administrations, and French and foreign literature. One source
suggests that Bonaparte used his two papers to point up by comparison
the faults of the Directory and to foster alarm about how France was 
52governed. Bonaparte did the same thing while in Egypt. In Cairo he
ordered an official journal printed to report on news of the French
colony. Entitled Courrier d 1Egypt this paper was supposed to print
what was happening in Egypt and to give some idea of what the
situation was . in France. Its articles primarily reflected the opinions 
53of Bonaparte. Thus upon his return to France and following the days 
of Brumaire, Bonaparte was no stranger to an artificially manipulated 
press and was more than likely prepared to take whatever steps he 
found necessary to get his views across to the public as he wished them 
made known.
Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 207; Hatin, Histoire politique, 
VII-VIII, 381-827 386.
53Mitton, La Presse Franpaise, 208.
CHAPTER II 
IMPLEMENTATION
When Bonaparte seized the government he ignored initially the 
strict censorship under which the press had operated. He allowed 
papers to express their own views, and thcatrcG to produce plays with­
out government clearance. Street criers hawked the newspapers in color­
ful and not always truthful terms. Pamphlets were distributed freely 
and posters were put on the walls of the cities without government 
interference. Even the provincial ;papers made what editorial state­
ments they wished regarding the coup de Brumaire. This is not to say 
that the government was unaware of what was being said, but for a brief 
time freedom of the press was a reality."^ Indeed, the press enjoyed
more freedom during the first two months of Bonapartefs coup than it
2
had in any time since 1793.
3
The political, economic and social situation was dire but there 
was hope. Paris was in a state of ruin, immorality was open and 
rampant. Industry was at a standstill; the major items for sale were 
imported, but the journals poured out the optimism that Bonaparte
Ernest Lavisse, Histoire de France contemporaine depuis la 
revolution jusqu*a la paix de 1919 (10 vols; Paris: Librairie Hachette, 
1911), III, 61. Hereafter cited as Lavisse, Histoire de France.
2
Robert B. Holtman, Napoleonic Propaganda (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1950), 44. Hereafter cited as Holtman, 
Propaganda.
3
Ernest d fHauterive, La Contre-police Royaliste en 1800 (Paris: 
Librairie Academique Perrin, 1931), 4-9.
17
18
would set everything right again. However, each journal felt that it 
had the right solutions to the problem, and an excitable, unlettered 
public found itself being led and torn between conflicting reports and 
theories. Given such a set of circumstances Napoleon believed it was
necessary to have some control over the press and thereby public
. . 5opinion.
As each faction fought for supremacy, each paper, pamphlet or
poster called on Bonaparte to put a stop to any writings which were
opposed to its ideas. Since such factionalizing had led to the
paralysis of the Year VIII he perforce had to organize and dominate the
forces of the Revolution. He had to make the people see the values he
could bring to them but not the force he would use to secure those
values. They could not be allowed to see the losses they would suffer
in mind and in freedom of spirit in order to enjoy the benefits of his
rule. Bonaparte had to silence discordant factions, for to allow them
freedom in the France which existed in late 1799 and early 1800, was a
£
certain invitation to further coup and anarchy. The Royalist factions 
found sympathy for their desire to recall Louis XVIII and had to be 
silenced for Bonaparte had no intention of recalling the Bourbons. The 
Jacobins, fearing the Royalists and the possibility that Bonaparte
4 ^Albert Vandal, L fAyenement de Bonaparte (2 vols; 17th ed. J 
Paris: Plon-Nourrit et C ifci. , Imprimeurs-fiditeurs, 1911), II, 71. 
Hereafter cited as Vandal, L’Avenement.
Napoleon, Correspondence de Napoleon I (32 vols; Paris: 
Imprimerie-Imperiale, 1858-1869), VI, 42-43. Hereafter cited as 
Napoleon, Correspondence.
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might restore the monarchy, set up a loud opposition to the Consulate 
so they too had to be silenced. The press, morever, was irresponsible 
in its reporting. Editors printed every rumor they heard, including 
such items as sensitive military operations, and as so much of Paris 
was illiterate, the street vendors cried out the news, particularly 
that which was of sensational nature.^ With the chaotic conditions that 
existed in France, this type of reporting had to come to a stop if any 
order was to be established. Some force had to keep the various 
f action1 s influence to a minimum and keep every rumor from arousing 
further an already distraught public. The threat of future uprisings 
and continuing internal strife were two of the major facets of French 
life that Bonaparte had to remedy if he were to succeed.
The need for government control rested in the internal condition 
of France at the time of Brumaire. The French people were exhausted by 
continuous war and immoral government more distinguished by corruption 
than for devising viable policies. As a result, the various factions 
of French political life had been openly opposed to the Directory and 
for a brief moment all factions had united against one evil. Each 
political faction, the Royalists, the Jacobins, the Constitutional
x
7 \
L. Lanzac de Laborie, Consulat Provisoire et Consulat a Temps
* ■■■ ■ 10      ■  -i —  y  l, ■ . i l i ■ l —  .1 -- '1 >- I.
(8 vols; Paris: Plon Nourritt et C ., Imprimeurs-Editeurs, 1905), I, 
205. Hereafter cited as Laborie, Consulat. Also see Henri Welschinger, 
La Censure sous le Premier Empire (Paris: Charavez Freres-Editeurs, 
1882),13. Hereafter cited as Welschinger, La Censure.
20
Monarchists and the Republicans saw in Bonaparte an answer to their 
problems•
Bonapartefs triumph at St. Cloud seemed to be the dawn of a new 
era. All of France felt that conditions would improve immediately.
Paris was released from the influence of the mob; clerics came to life 
again, and there was optimism with regard to the hope that the Church 
might again function. The study of the sciences was revived and
g
reborn. All factions thought that now they would at last have their
way. Each paper published spoke of how conditions would become better,
assuming the new government would accept its advice with regard to its
own political feelings. The Jacobin papers, in the light of Bonaparte*s
political past, felt that now the Revolution, and they, were safe. The
Royalist papers expressed the hope that Bonaparte would call the
Bourbons back to the throne. The moderate Republicans hoped that the
excesses of the Revolution would end. The Constitutional Monarchists
repeated their call for a constitutional monarchy. The new freedom,
however, contained the seeds of still more discontent. The more
moderate papers such as J_e Diplomate and Gazette de France called on
Bonaparte to stop the Jacobins, claiming that they had ravaged France 
9
for ten years. The Parisians were alarmed at the prospect of a civil
^Vandal, L*Avenement, I, 446-50. Also see Andre Castelot,
Josephine: A Biography, trans. by Denise Folliot (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc., 1967); _______________ , Napoleon, trans. from
the French by Guy Daniels (First ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1971); 
and Vincent Cronin, Napoleon Bonaparte, An Intimate Biography (New 
York; Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973).
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war between the Royalist and Jacobin fact ions. The Republican
journals called Bonaparte too conservative and the Royalists called him 
11too radichl. Thus to a demand for liberty of the press he could reply
". • • in a moment I should have thirty Royalist journals and as many
12Jacobin ones and I should have to govern with a minority.11 The
division that these various opinions and expectations fostered made it
necessary that Bonaparte take some decisive action.
The Constitution of the Year VIII promulgated on 25 December 1799,
contained no mention of the press, and the Consular government tended
to arrogate to itself those responsibilities which the Constitution did
13not specifically state. Thus, Bonaparte, on 27 December 1799, declared
that the Moniteur was the only official journal. It would consist of
four pages of three columns each and contain notices, proclamations,
and Consular decisions. It was charged with keeping hearts loyal to 
14the Republic. Bonaparte took this action to discredit other journals 
which were, at this time, printing news which they purported to be a 
forecast of the actions the government would take. By designating the
10Ibid., II, 38.
11
Ibid., II, 35-40.
12
William Milligan Sloane, The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte (4 vols; 
New York: the Century Company, 1916) II, 254.
13
Jacques Godechot, Les Inst itut ions de la France sous La 
Revolution et 11Empire (Paris: Imprimerie des Universitaires de France, 
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Laborie, Consulat, I, 206.
14 vVandal, L *Avenement, I. 552-53$ Moniteur, Septidi, 7 Nivose, An 8,
#97, 1.
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Moniteur the only official journal Bonaparte, in effect, indicated
that the news printed by any other journal was only that journal*s
opinion and was not of an official nature. The above action, according
to one authority, was the first move in a planned series of moves to
15suppress the liberty of the press.
The new legislative bodies met on 1 January 1800. In the first
session there evolved an incident which, when reported by the papers,
apparently helped to solidify Bonaparte*s feelings about the press.
The Tribunate had only so much time within which it could consider or
16examine a piece of proposed legislation. Benjamin Constant, a member
of the Tribunate, spoke against the limit and against the fact that
while the Tribunate could discuss it could not propose nor vote on
proposed legislation. The Corps Legislatif had the prerogative of
passing or rejecting legislation but it could not discuss. Constant
17called this a *'. . . regime of servitude and silence." The majority 
of the Tribunate, however, men whom Bonaparte hand-picked, supported 
the Constitution, and called for termination of Constant’s speech and 
for the meeting to get on with a discussion of the law under
15Laborie, Consulat, I, 206.
16
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. 1 8consrderation.
The press reported the meeting in various fashions slanted to fit
individual editors particular political bent. Certain journals spoke
out against the membership of the Tribunate. They said that such
dissension was only what could be expected when a group of men who were
worn out, discredited, and used to a life of discord acted as public
servants. These journals stated that the men of the Tribunate would be
19at fault if the pacific act of Brumaire should come to failure. The
Journal des Hommes-Libres, written under the direction of Joseph Fouche,
stated that since Constant was one of the dissenting leaders his speech
was not worthy of note for Constant was involved in a lewd affair with
Madame de Stael. On the other hand, the Gazette de France insinuated
that Constant was really in the pay of the Abbe Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes
20and behind Sieyes was the Orleanist faction. The journals of the far
right, the Royalists, denounced the Tribunate, for dissension presented
them with an opportunity to discredit the men of the Revolution, many of
21whom sat in the Tribunate. The dissenters in the Tribunate found only
18
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one defender. The moderate Republican 1tAmi des lois stated that while
it did not equate Bonaparte with Cromwell, if Bonaparte should abuse
the military powers, break his pact with the French people, and by
violence dispel the various factions which were in evidence in the
Tribunate, the French must find a Washington of their own to lead them
22
to republicanism such as was found in America,
The outcry of the press, the various interpretations that were put 
upon the actions that took place in the Tribunate, were of a nature that 
could not be allowed to continue, France was already torn apart by 
conflict. The journal’s in reporting the meeting as they saw fit, in 
accordance with their own political wishes, were inciting the people to 
lose confidence in a government which had barely begun to function. If 
allowed to continue unchecked, the press would succeed only in aiding 
the overthrow of the Brumairists. The people’s minds were indoctrin­
ated with the idea that a legislative uprising such as had just taken
23place usually preceded a coup or an uprising in the government.
Such beliefs, of course, Bonaparte and the Brumairists could not allow 
at this time. The next step was now clear, the press had to be 
controlled somehow.
In answer to the journal’s reports on the stormy first meeting of 
the Tribunate, Bonaparte had the Moniteur print on 8 January 1800,
22
Ibid,, II, 55. 
23Ibid., II, 53.
25
that in the Tribunate there was no real opposition to the government.
The people who had spoken against the government were merely people who
wished to draw attention to themselves and to have their names brought
to the publicTs attention. However, the journals still did not stop
25
printing the news as they saw fit. More stringent measures were 
necessary.
In a meeting on 16 January 1800, Bonaparte pondered what action to
take with regard to the press. Pierre-Louis Roederer, who was present
at this meeting, along with Charles Francois Lebrun, Jean-Jacques
Cambaceres and others, agreed with one of Bonaparte's suggestions that
each province be allowed only one journal and Paris be allowed a total 
2 6of six. Another suggestion was that papers be submitted to the Senate 
for approval. Cambaceres feared the danger that might result from 
leaving such approval to the Senate. Lebrun proposed that a tax be 
placed on journals and control be exercised in that manner. They 
finally agreed to limit publications and the terms appeared in the
^ Moniteur, Octidi, 18 Niv<5se, An 8, #108, 1.
25
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Even though France had been divided administratively into 
departments and arrondissements, the old divisions were still referred 
to as provinces.
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consular decree of 17 January 1800. This decree, known as the Law of
27 Nivose, stated that the Minister of Police allow, during the duration
of the war, the publication of only thirteen newspapers within the
28
Department of the Seine. The decree also stated that all journals 
concerned exclusively with the sciences, arts, literature, commerce, 
announcements, and notices were not suppressed. The Minister of the 
Police was to report on all journals printed in other departments and 
make certain that no new papers were printed within the Department of 
the Seine or any other departments of the Republic. The owners and 
editors of the journals affected by the decree were to present them­
selves to the Minister of Police to swear fidelity to the Constitution, 
to their quality as Frenchmen, and to give their place of residence and 
their signature. Also suppressed were all journals which showed a lack 
of respect for the social pact, the sovereignity of the people, the 
glory of the armies, or that published anything derogatory against the 
government or friends of the governments allied with the Republic.
27
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29or extracted from foreign journals any such articles. Thus the papers '
in.Paris were .reduced from seventy-three to thirteen. The public
accepted the. decree calmly and peacefully and some people even
expressed pleasure that now the detestable writings would finally 
30cease. Thus the door was opened wide to arbitrary censorship by the
31head of state in concert with the police.
In any discussion of censorship one must contend not only with
Napoleon Bonaparte, but also with another less well-known figure, the
Minister of Police - Joseph Fouche. When Napoleon seized power in
November 1799, he appointed Fouche as Minister of Police, a man who had
earned a.reputation for excellence while Minister of Police under the 
32Directory. He was a known Jacobin, regicide, terrorist --  an all
around man of the Revolution. For these reasons Bonaparte felt that
33Fouchd would help control the revolutionary factions within France.
By. the decree of 17 Nivose the power to stop journals from operating, to 
screen editors, to report on what papers said, and though it was not
29
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spelled out in so many words, the power to decide what was considered
anti-government rested with the Minister of Police. Any task which was
under the Ministry of Police was also under Fouche. He was not a man to
delegate positions without being certain he would know exactly what was
going on throughout those areas for which he was responsible. Fouche
was not a man to subordinate himself to any master but he and Napoleon
34
worked well together, with a few exceptions, for some nine years.
What was the real function of Fouche in the role of censorship? The 
role, like the man himself, is difficult to trace, ambigous and twist- 
ingj however, there is little doubt that Fouche was the ultimate 
authority behind most steps taken with regard to censorship in France 
from 1800 to 1810.
Fouche soon proved his competence to the Provisional Consulate.
With regard to censorship he did nothing in the first few days after 
Brumaire. The people were happyj let them savor this new sensation 
for a while. The brutal treatment to which the press had been subject­
ed under the Directory ceased. During the six weeks of the Provisional 
Consulate only one journal was persecuted. Both the editor and the 
printer of the notoriously Royalist journal, 1fAristarque, were 
arrested. However, the two men were released shortly after their
34Ibid., 19-44.
29
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arrest and suffered only a reprimand from the Central Bureau,
Fouche, regardless of this time of relative inactivity, was the 
3 6
master of the press. He controlled directly some of the comments 
repeated in the Journal des Hommes-Libres in a rather devious manner 
and one that should serve to illustrate just how this man*3 mind 
functioned. The Journal des Hommes-Libres, also known at various times 
as Ennemi des oppresseurs de tous les temps, Journal des hommes, and 
Journal des republicains, was known as a Jacobin journal. Shortly after 
Brumaire, Fouche, rather than suppressing the journal, endeavoured to 
control it. He managed to gain control of the journal by appointing
/ 37as its principal editor one Mehee de la Touche, The journal then,
while it enjoyed a reputation of being a free agent and a Jacobin
journal, was in reality under the control of Fouche. If this journal
spoke against any adverse reaction to Brumaire it immediately seemed
that the Jacobins supported Bonaparte. On the contrary, if it spoke
^Vandal, LfAvenement, I. 463.
Bonaparte, while reorganizing internal administration, replaced 
the Central Bureau with the Prefecture of Paris in 1800. Under the 
Directory, the Central Bureau functioned much as a police headquarters 
to the city of Paris, For a complete breakdown on how the police 
functioned under Fouche^ see Nelson, "Napoleonic Police,"
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37
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30
against something that the Royalists had done it would appear that it
was only running down its opposition since anything the Royalists
favored the Jacobins automatically suspected. By being the man behind
the scene Fouche, through judicious insertion of editorials or slanted
news items, controlled the feelings ascribed to the Jacobins and at the
same time conveyed to the rest of Paris the impression that this was
the Jacobin view. The control also would have benefited Fouche* in the
event the Brumairists were overthrown. Fouche would then have had a
well-oiled instrument for expressing whatever views he thought 
38
expedient. Even though the government took no immediate action
against the press, within twelve days after Brumaire Fouche had shown
the journals and papers what to expect from him. He wrote that in the
future there would be no communications to journalists, no billeting,
39
nor notes issued without police approval. Now this man, by a decree
of 17 January, held what amounted to dictatorial powers over the press
of Paris and France.
Immediately following the Law of 17 NivOse some of the suppressed
journals continued to print news. However, these journals were quickly
seized and their plants closed. By these examples other such acts were
discouraged. The Paris journals now numbered thirteen. One of the
reasons for the retention of the thirteen journals was that they
40possessed an established clientele and substantial fame. In effect,
3 8
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the Consuls had perpetrated a type of miniature Fructidor except that 
instead of proscribing, journalists they suppressed journals. The
41journals of. the extreme right were, in effect, executed "en masse.”
The. thirteen remaining journals felt themselves forced to heap praise
upon the. Consuls. However, they attempted by delicate slanting to put
forth.their political opinions. The Journal des Hommes-Libres remained
the voice.of the Jacobins. The Journal de Paris and Le Publiciste
approved the decrees of 27 NivcSse and maintained that during the
reconstruction of the government and the duration of the war some
discipline was necessary. The Gazette de France desired that the
Consulate resemble as much as possible the ancien regime and its
42
editorial tone reflected this desire. In effect the Law of 27 Nivose 
had not stopped the press from attempting to influence public opinion 
in.one.way or another and that influence the First Consul did not 
desire.
The Directory, attempting to explain the suppression of the press, 
had found it necessary to report periodically'the discovery of plots 
against itself. These propagandistic reports were not believed by the 
public. Now, it was just the opposite. The journals reported plots 
against the government, some true, some not, and the people believed 
them* .However, the government did not desire such items printed. To 
stop this type of reporting the Consuls took urgent action. Since the 
Jacobins were particularly amenable to violent overthrow of authority,
41 *Vandal, LfAvenement, II, 72.
42Ibid., II, 296.
the Journal des Hommes-Libres was suppressed in April 1800. The
freedom to put up posters, cry out the news, or print a journal or
pamphlet which did not have the approval of the police was forbidden.
The presentation of any play which had not been cleared by the Minister
43of the Interior was also forbidden. The orders did not meet with 
FoucheTs approval. Bonaparte had moved overtly against the Jacobins 
and Fouche did not feel that this was advisable. In a meeting with 
Bonaparte and Lucien, Fouche expressed his opinion and he and Lucien 
argued violently over the advisability of suppressing the Jacobins.
The police reports for the next day or two, which were submitted to 
Bonaparte, were slanted in such a manner that it appeared that only the 
Royalists were responsible for the agitation which existed. Within
three days of its suppression the Journal des Hommes-Libres was in
. 44operation again.
In the operation of censorship there was not under the Consulate a
/ 45clear division of duties. Fouche and his subordinates were charged
with carrying out the actual suppressions of papers and policing the 
theatres. The Ministry of Police had no clear cut order to be 
responsible for the content of the papers, or what the theatre present­
ed.' The Ministry did not hold within itself the power to order changes
Ibid., II, 339; Napoleon, Correspondence, VI, 266.
44 vVandal, L’Avenement, II, 339-40.
45For a study of who these subordinates were and how they 
functioned within the department see Nelson, ’'Napoleonic Police,” 
Chapter III.
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in the written or spoken word. There was no law sanctioned by a legally
46constituted body which provided for censorship, but it was practiced
47
in_varying degrees of severity. Who held ultimate control over what
was inserted in the papers? Bonaparte gave this question consideration
and heard,varying opinions on the matter. Joseph Fievee, former editor
48
of the Chronique de Paris and an advisor to Bonaparte, agreed that the
Police should have the power to suppress the papers but did not feel
that they should have the power to dictate what the papers said. Fievee
and Fouche were enemies of long standing and this may have had some
bearing on FieveeTs opinions. However, he put forth the idea that the
Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice should dictate
what the press printed and the ultimate decision should rest with the
First Consul. The greater part of these deliberations took place from
February 1800 until the end of the year. The result was that Bonaparte
did not follow FieveeTs suggestion and while he did not issue a decree
to the effect that the police would dictate what was printed, he did
allow Fouche a fairly free hand with regard to what the papers printed
49or did not print. By the end of 1800 the police dictated to the
46Godechot, Les Inst itut ions, 658; Laborie, Consulat, I, 216. 
Censorship was not legally established until 5 February.1810.
47 /Hauterive, Napoleon police, 198.
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existing journals what to print and they gave explicit instructions at
*. • 50times not to mention a certain name or event.
The First Consul'on 5 April 1800, directed Fouche to determine
that the editors of journals were of good faith and patriotic nature,
were not corrupt, and that in the future every journal printed would be
51required to carry the signature of an approved editor. Under this
directive Fouche^ installed a bureau of the press within the Ministry of
Police to survey journals and books. A chief of this division and
examining officials under him had charge of the work. The Prefect of
the Police in Paris received orders that he should allow no postings
on the walls of the city without his approval.
The theatre came now under the control of the Minister of the
Interior who had the duty to approve all theatricals produced. The
Minister approved all plays presented in Paris; in the provinces the
prefects examined new plays and sent reports to the Minister of the
Interior. As for old plays, the directors of the plays must submit a
resume for ministerial approval. Such were the preliminaries of
52theatrical censorship.
The First Consul was kept current on all publications. Louis-
Madeleine Ripault, reader to the First Consul, had charge of analyzing
50
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53all the journals printed on religion, philosophy, and politics. He 
was also to analyze books, plays, wall posters, placards, and
54
announcements and to submit a report each day to the First Consul.
As the Consular regime progressed the government censored or
55suppressed journals for a variety of reasons. A provincial journal,
the Republicaindemocrate (d*Auch) was suppressed for speaking of a rise
in the price of grain; a fact brought to Lucien*s attention as
Minister of the Interior by the prefect of Gers and the suppression
56
was ordered by Lucien. On 28 May 1800, the Consuls issued an order to 
suppress 1*Ami des lois for having dared to ridicule the Institute of 
Paris. ^  The Correspondence des Councils nationale was seized in the 
month of August 1801, for u11ramontaine opinions. On 10 August the 
Moniteur announced the suppression of 1 Antidote which was ”. • • full 
of horrible maxims which will produce all kinds of trouble.” It is
53Ibid., 14; Napoleon Correspondence, VI, 533.
54Welschinger, La Censure, 15; Godechot, Les Institut ions, 656; 
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It is interesting to note the action by the Consuls was taken 
when Bonaparte was in Italy. When he heard of it he wrote a lengthy 
diatribe to the Consuls, to the effect that they should not have issued 
such an order and that liberty of the press must be allowed at all 
costs. Napoleon Correspondence, VI, 432. For further enlightenment 
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interesting to note that this order was countersigned by the infamous 
58Mehee, On 25 September the Prefect of Police of Paris, Louis Nicolas
Pierre Joseph Dubois, issued a notice to stop for the moment the
circulation and sale of the Journal des Debats and Gazette de France for
reproducing a story on the Pope and nineteen Bishops who were exiled in
L o n d o n . D u b o i s  also served notice at this time, by order of Fouche,
from Bonaparte, that any other journals which mentioned religion or
60
ministers were to be subject to the same fate.
The various censors used their authority in curious ways.^ The 
issue of 2 October 1801 Gazette de France was censored because it had 
made a joke about doormen. Why this should so offend the censors is 
not clear. The censor, Beaulieu, spoke in 1802 of making a M. . . 
small correction . . .  M in a story that a paper had printed. The small 
correction consisted of suppressing the journal and imprisoning the 
editor. The seizures, suppressions, and arbitrary measures multiplied. 
The owners of the Publiciste, were forced to submit to Fouche*s desire 
that Marigniez be editor of their journal. Provincial journals also 
were censored, and the government took action to protect Frenchmen from 
French language papers published abroad. Mengaud, Commissioner-General 
of the ports of Manche and Pas-de-Calais demanded on 29 August 1802,
58
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that the Minister of Police take action against English journals that
attacked Bonaparte. The Gazette de Leyde was seized on 2 September
1802, at the frontier and its circulation forbidden in France. The
same treatment was accorded the Spectateur de Nord.
Censorship did not apply only to papers, journals, and theatres.
It also applied to books but in a slightly different manner. There was
no definite commission for reviewing books until 27 September 1803.
At that time by Consular decree, a revisionary commission was
established and was to receive from the Prefect of the Police a copy
62
of all books printed. They were to pass judgment :upon the contents
and report to the Grand Judge who would in turn report to Napoleon.
In 1803, then, the censorship of books was placed under the Minister
of Justice. From 1800 to 1804, however, the Fifth Oivision of the
63
Police had the job of surveying all printing and book shops. Contents
of the books were not changed or passages deleted, but the entire book 
64
was suppressed.
The police in 1800 brought forth a grave question in the affair of
62
From available sources it would appear that the prefect was the 
Prefect of Paris.
63
There is an overlap of a few months here in which it has been 
impossible to ascertain if both the commission and the police division 
functioned or if one or the other was supreme.
64Welschinger, La Censure, 16-18.
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65 #a brochure entitled Parallele entre Cesar, Cromwell, Monk, et
Bonaparte, This brochure was supposedly written by Fontanes, a writer
of the reactionary partisans, but it has been fairly well-established
that Lucien was really behind it and probably at the express order of
66the First Consul. When the brochure appeared it caused a most
unfavorable feeling against Bonaparte. A man who could never admit
6 7
that he had made an error, Bonaparte was furious at the reaction the
publication of the brochure had produced and especially singled out
Fouche for having allowed it to get into print. Fouche ordered the
brochure seized and issued a statement that the book was part of a
68
treasonous plot against the government. The affair, so far as the 
public was concerned, quieted down but there were repercussions in the 
relationship of Fouche7, Bonaparte, and Lucien0 Bonaparte had to find 
someone to take the blame for his own miscalculation and Lucien fitted 
the requirements. He relieved his brother of the Ministry of the 
Interior and sent him to Spain. But where did the guilt lie for having 
allowed the brochure to get into print? True, Bonaparte approved it
65
Welschinger in his chapter entitled Des Livres uses the terms 
livres, brochure, and pamphlet when speaking of the various 
publications.
^Welschinger, La Censure, 133; Madelin, Fouche', I, 332.
^ M .  Fauvelet de Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, 
tran. from the French by John S. Memes (3 vols; New York: P. F. 
Collier, 1892) I, 244.
68 /Welschinger, La Censure$ 134; Madelin* Fouche, I, 333.
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but only after having received advice from someone that it was the
thing to do at the time. The person behind the advice was Joseph 
/ 69Fouche.. . The affair was one of the reasons for the ultimate dismissal
of Fouche in 1802 from the Ministry of Police. Bonaparte never forgave
Fouche for having discovered the entire plot and the role Bonaparte 
70played. Other books or brochures and pamphlets were censored also.
The police seized on 5 December 1801 a brochure entitled Immigration
which had formented trouble among people holding land previously owned 
71
by Emigre's. There was anxiety among the people holding former nob lesT 
land as to whether or not the government planned to return the land to 
the emigres. The Gri de lmurnanite" pour les victimes engorgees sous 
Robespierre was suppressed on 13 December for it had stirred up bad 
memories. The Lettre d*un Franyaise was suppressed on 26 December 
for writing about the re-establishment of the Catholic religion.
Another book vigorously proscribed by the Minister of Police was one 
which had already been suppressed under the Directory. Considerations 
sur la France by Comte Joseph de Maistre, was most severe in its 
judgments against the men of the Revolution and called on the French to
69 tPierre-Louis Roederer, M^moires sur La Revolution Le Consulat
et LfEmpire (Textes choisis et pr^sentes par^Octave Aubryj Paris: Les 
Petite-Fils de Plon et Nourrit, Imprimeurs Editeurs, 1942) 153-54.
70
Welschinger, La Censure, 135.
71
All succeeding material in this paragraph, unless otherwise 
noted, is taken from Welschinger, La Censure, 136-57.
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think again of their King. In 1802, a member of the old Five. Hundred, 
Camille Jordon, incurred BonaparteTs wrath by the publication of.a.book 
entitled Le vrai sens du vote national sur le Consulat a vie. Jordon 
supported the motion of a Consulate for life but he advocated having 
certain guarantees such as the end of arbitrary arrest, ministerial 
responsibility, and liberty for the press. The book was seized and 
Jordon held under arrest for a time. Certain books, however, escaped 
the notice of the censors because they were worded in such a way that
their meaning was not immediately clear. Abbe/ Delille’s Poernes .'de la
72 /
Pitie, was one such book. Fievee finally brought this work to the
First Consul’s attention and Bonaparte, as a result wrote to his
Minister of Justice, Claude Aubroise Regnier, on 7 July 1803, telling
him to allow seven days for the study of a book before it was author-
73
ized for publication. Pamphlets against the First Consul were printed
in profusion in London, Berlin, and Fauche-Borel by Royalist agents.
The dramatist Geoffrey on 3 June 1803, was ordered to delete from his
work Commentaire des oeuvres de Racine a passage dealing with the
excesses of anarchy and tyranny. All books which dealt with military
74
matters were prohibited unless cleared by the Ministry of War. The 
censors did perform one service for France, in the opinion of some
72Abbe/ Jacques Delille was a French poet noted for his 
translation of-Milton and M. . . famous for his ingenious method of 
paraphrasing.M Dictionnaire Encyclogedique Pour Tous Pet it Larousse 
(Paris: Librarie Larousse, 1964, 19 Tirage), 1309.
^Napoleon, Correspondence, VIII, 491.
74Holtman, Propaganda, 79.
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perhaps. They suppressed the writings of the erotic-maniac, the Marquis 
de. Sade,. He had the audacity to offer his Justine and Juliette to the 
First Consul, Bonaparte promptly threw the work into the fire; the 
censors seized all copies and de Sade was arrested.
Thus, though Bonaparte insisted censorship did not exist in France, 
it is clear that controls did exist. Perhaps the country was a bit more 
quiet, but it was a bit less free, and without warning France drifted 
closer to tyranny.
CHAPTER III 
CONCLUSION
When Napoleon became Emperor on 18 May 1804 and although his 
feelings on the press were well known he had inserted in section.VIII 
of the senatus consultum establishing the imperial government articles 
LXIV through LXVII a senatorial commission called the liberty of the 
press. The commission was composed of seven members chosen, from the 
Senate elected by ballot by the Senators. Any authors, printers, or 
bookmakers could take their grievances directly to the commission. 
However, upon close examination of these articles in the senatus 
consultum, one discovers that these works had to be printed and dis­
tributed by subscription and within a certain time or they did not
1
come under the jurisdiction of the commission. In reality the
2
periodic press had no guarantee. A decree of 9 July 1804 reestablished
to the Minister of Police, with the scope or jurisdiction of the high
police, the surveillance of journals and books. The independence of
journals was nonexistent. It rested solely on the arbitrary power of 
3
of the police. Napoleon spoke of the press in general as ,T. • • my
Mitton, La Presse Franyaise 226} Hauterive, Napoleon police,
157. Additional comments on the essential futility and cumbersomeness 
of these articles are also made by Deslandres, Histoire Const itut ion- 
nelle, I, 568.
2
Mitton, La Presse Frangaise, 227; Hauterive, Napoleon police, 
157; Welschinger, La Censure, 18-19.
3Hauterive, Napoleon police, 157.
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43
journals,M
After 1804 with the return of that redoubtable Minister, Joseph 
Fouche, Napoleon continued his vigilance of the printed word but he 
had a more reliable censorship organ than previously - Fouche and the 
police.^ It is one of the interesting facts of the First Empire that 
one man (Napoleon) held absolute control over so many varied facets of
g
life in France. Napoleon had reports coming directly to him from all 
parts of the Empire and by and large these were accurate reports 
considering the size, complexity, and divergences of the people and 
areas controlled. As previously mentioned Fievee was invaluable to 
Napoleon as his personal reporter but he relied upon a number of people 
to report to him on the events in his Empire.^ There is little doubt 
in this writer* s mind, however, that one of the main supports of 
Napoleon*s surveillance system, if not the main support, was Fouche.
Napoleon, by a series of decrees issued on 10 July 1804 recalled 
Fouche to the post of Minister of the Police, and established that the 
surveillance of journals was exclusively the province of the Minister
g
of the general police. The men Fouche gathered to work under him, such as 
Pierre-Marie Desmarest, head of the secret police, concerned themselves
4
Mitton, JLa Presse Frangaise, 227.
5
Welschinger, La Censure, 59.
6 /Hauterive, Napoleon police, 32.
^Nelson, nNapolconic police”, 97; Welschinger, La Censure, 67-68.
g
Godechot, Les Institutions, 658.
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with all the services of the press. Fouche and the police now had the
power to slant the news. Previously this had not been true. Napoleon
in his correspondence to Fouche had shown a marked preference for
detailed planning of articles and slanting of events to produce the
9 /effect he desired. Fouche later received only broad orders to produce
a particular effect on the public*s mind; the details were left to the 
10Minister. A decree of 10 July 1804 divided all France into four
ayrondissements and put at the head of each a Concillor of State. These
four men were Pierre-Francois Real, Pelet de la Lozere, Miot and
Dubois. Such an administrative move thus relieved Fouche of much of
the routine of surveillance but allowed him to have complete reports
11
on every facet of the French press.
There is ample evidence that while Fouche did an excellent job of
keeping the press under control on his own, Napoleon was ever aware of
what was happening. Napoleon*s correspondence contains many examples
12of this awareness. Letters were constantly being written by Napoleon 
from wherever he might be instructing Fouche to take specific steps to
^Napoleon, Correspondence, X, 532, 557-78, 688-98.
10Ibid., XIV, 157, XVI, 165.
11 / Godechot, Les Institutions, 530; Le Poittevin, La Liberte,
116-17. For a more detailed knowledge of how the concillors worked
and in what areas, see Nelson, "Napoleonic police," 48-49.
For a complete list of type and number of journals printed and/or
circulated in each department see Welschinger, La Censure, 290-93.
Napoleon, Correspondence, VI-X.
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13
stop a rumor or to plant a story. According to one authority the
content of any printed matter could be traced to one or another
governmental source by the headings affixed to the document. For
example, articles headed "politique” came direct from the Emperor’s
cabinet; if printed in foreign journals they came by way of the
appropriate minister, usually the minister of foreign relations.
Everything appearing under the heading of "interieur" was edited by the
Minister of the Interior. "Paris" was comprised of articles coming by
way of the cabinet from the Emperor and included resumes of assembly
debates and publications of decrees. The heading "melanges" was
composed of propaganda fabricated within the ministries. Other headings
included "institut," "Poesie," "Litterature," and "spectacles," all
14
consisting of officially contrived or fabricated news. As Napoleon
traveled about Europe he read his journals closely and if something
displeased or irritated him he quickly notified Fouche, often using
15terms that were harsh to say the least.
Censorship under the control of the police seemed to work rather 
smoothly, as smoothly as control of the mind and spirit of a people can, 
until sometime around 1808. This time limit seems to correspond with
13 /Le Poittevin, La Libert^ 118-19; Hauterive, Napoleon police, 161.
For a more complete picture as to how Napoleon managed this personal 
surveillance of written works see Hauterive, Napoleon police, 32; 
Napoleon, Correspondence, X-XIV.
14
Godechot, Les Institutions, 657.
15Mitton, La Presse Fran^aise, 229; Napole'on, Correspondence^ X,
536.
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16the beginning of Fouche*s disillusionment with his Emperor., A
conclusion drawn from this would seem to be that so long as Fouche and
Napoleon were in agreement the police function of censorship managed
to repress the public spirit to Napoleon*s satisfaction. Napoleon
insisted throughout his reign, but especially until 1810, that he did
not advocate any type of censorship. Between 1799 and 1810 Napoleon
17was most vehement in this idea - Censorship did not exist in France.
However, as Fouche became disillusioned and began to allow the police
18
to loosen their hold on the public mind Napoleon began to change his
tactics. He still did not advocate censorship openly but he began to
solicit advice from many quarters on how'he might best, control the
19opinion of the French people. The end result of this search was a
16
Nelson, ’’Napoleonic police”, 119-2-2; j Hat in, Histoire politique 
VII - VIII, 526; Fievee, Correspondence, II, 262. It would appear 
that the disillusionment worked both ways and had from Napoleon*s 
side for some time.
17
Welschinger, La Censure, 22.
18
From 1808 on Fouch^ became increasingly involved in trying to 
curb Napoleon*s war policy and preserve the Empire according to his 
(Fouche*s) own lights. It could be therefore that there was no
deliberate thought in Fouche*s mind to loosen police control but rather
his interests in other areas caused his attention to the police to be
less watchful. Nelson, ’’Napoleonic police," 119.
19 /Hauterive, Napoleon police, 203-05.
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20
decree of 5 February 1810. Such a measure had been in Napoleon*s
21mind for some time but he did not bring it to fruition until he and
Fouche^ began to be at cross purposes. Official censorship, which had
22
existed in one form or another ever since Napoleon came to power,
was legally recognized by the decree. Official censors were created
23
for printing and books and by a decree of 14 December 1810, the title
24
Imperial Censors was put into use.
From 1810 on the pressure Napoleon put upon his administration to 
control the press increased in direct proportion it seems to the lack 
of success of his ministers to accomplish his wishes. Fouche was no 
longer in control of the ministry of police. Rene* Savary, Due de
20For the complete text of the Decree see Moniteur, Mercredi, 7 
Fevrier 1810, #38, 156-57; Welschinger, La Censure, 279-86. Also see 
Frank Maloy Anderson, The Constitutions and other Select Documents 
Illustrative of the History of France (Minneapolis: H. W. Wilson Co.,
1904), 433-.
The Decree of 5 February 1810 synthesized many of the previous 
measures taken against the press. The measures had been used since 
1804, but not enacted into law until 1810.
21Welschinger, La Censure, 28.
22
Hauterive, Napoleon police, 198.
23
Previously censors did not bear the title "Official Censors". 
For names of official censors see Welschinger, La Censure, 32.
24 /
Moniteur, Jeudi, 20 Decembre 1810, #354, 1409-10; Godechot,
Les Institutions, 658; Le Poittevin, La Liberte, 61; Welschinger, La 
Censure, 33.
j 25
Rovigo, replaced Fouche in title but hardly in ability. By this time
the official papers printed were organized into such a system of lies
that only the severest examination could gain any type of correct
impression. This included those who were responsible for the papers
2 6
content as well as the general public. Savary reduced the number of 
papers still further than before and by a decree of 4 February 1811 
the number of papers in Paris was reduced to four; the Moniteur, 
Journal de 1*Empire, Gazette de France, and Journal de Paris. All
2'
other journals were suppressed and all their assets were confiscated.
The most important time period in the First Empire with regard to 
the Administration of censorship was undoubtedly from Brumaire through 
1804. Within that time period the actual manner in which censorship 
was to function was tried, refined and set. The relationship of the 
French people with their Emperor was a good one in light of their 
previous leaders* relationships. The timing was well planned for 
censorship to work if it was ever going to work. Research indicates 
that effective censorship was a reality as long as the administrators 
were effective competent men with faith in their leader. When their 
faith began to break down and the ablest of men were no longer
^^Welschinger, La Censure, 77.
2 6
Holtman, Propaganda, 59.
^ Moniteur, Jeudi, 7 Fevrier 1811, #58, 146;. Godechot, Les 
Institutions, 658.
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committed to an idea and a leader the administration of censorship
became a sometime thing* In certain cases such glaring errors were
made as to lead one to think Napoleon*s subordinates were
deliberately allowing inaccuracies so as to bring to the reading
28
public*s attention the fact that it was being duped*
There is much room for speculation on what happened after the
machinery began to break down. Was it deliberate on the part of
certain men in the government of the First Empire or did it give way
because of the ponderous weight of its own bureaucracy? Did Napoleon 
lose interest or see that censorship, no matter what he did, was a 
non-viable entity? If other matters had not intervened could the man 
who so greatly influenced late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Europe have added one more achievement to the long list history has 
attached to him whether in admiration or disdain? The questions go on 
to be answered perhaps at another time and in another framework. 
Censorship was a living thing, it was administered by a coterie of 
dedicated individuals and it did affect the Napoleonic government as 
well as the people and countries connected with or who came in contact 
with that government.
Holtman, Propaganda, 202.
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